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INTRODUCTION
OnJanuary 22, 1974, as a result of investigations by one of its plant physicians,
the B. F. Goodrich Company reported to the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) that several employees at its plastics factory in
Louisville, Kentucky, had died from angiosarcoma, a rare form of liver cancer.'
The workers had experienced chronic exposure to vinyl chloride, a colorless
gas used in the production of the solid plastic, polyvinyl chloride. 2 The discovery
of four deaths within five years at one facility was striking when viewed against
the U.S. average of about twenty-one deaths per year from this type of cancer.
3
In subsequent weeks, a hurried NIOSH survey turned up additional past
and present cases of angiosarcoma in workers at U. S. plants using vinyl chloride.
4
In addition, a report from Germany described cases of both angiosarcoma and
serious liver disease, non-cancerous but conceivably pre-cancerous, in workers
who fashioned floor tiles from polyvinyl chloride.5 The implication that vinyl
chloride might have leeched from the tiles gave particular cause for alarm; while
only 6,500 American employees are currently engaged in the production of poly-
vinyl chloride from vinyl chloride, there may be as many as 700,000 producing
plastic goods from polyvinyl chloride. 6 Disclosures that vinyl cloride is an ingre-
dient in the propellant of certain aerosol pestiddes,7 cosmetics, 8 drugs,9 and
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I See OSHA, Emergency Temporary Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg.
12,342 (1974).
2 See Auerbach, Liver Cancer Cases Spur Plant Inquiry, Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1974, §A, at
4, col. 1; Brody, Liver Cancer Alert Declared to Protect Plastics Workers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1974,
at 1, col. 8.
' See Saar, Vinyl Chloride and Cancer, Washington Post, May 5, 1974, § C, at 2, col. 1.
4 See OSHA, Emergency Temporary Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg.
12,342 (1974). See also Saar, supra note 3.
5 See Brody, Vinyl Chloride Parley Told of Danger to Workers, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1974, at 17,
col. 2; Kramer, Scientists Hear Reports Vinyl Chloride May Be More Dangerous Than Realized, Wall
St. J., May 13, 1974, at 8, col. 3.
6 See Kramer, supra note 5. Scientists have recently suggested that vinyl chloride exposure may
be associated with genetic damage and cancer at sites other than the liver. See Greider, Chemical
Tied to Defects, Washington Post, Aug. 22, 1974, § A, at 14, col. 1.7 See Environmental Protection Agency, Vinyl Chloride Emergency Suspension Order Concerning
Registrations for Certain Products and Intent to Cancel Registrations, 39 Fed. Reg. 14,753 (1974).
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household products, 10 that a freight train derailment in Philadelphia last April
discharged vinyl chloride from a tank car onto a highway, 1 and that factories
emit the gas into the environment 2 added to the alarm.
Publicity over vinyl chloride drew fresh public attention to the health hazards
of the workplace. The silent violence inflicted by industrial dusts, gases, and
liquids 3 provided much of the impetus for the passage of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970,14 which for the first time thrust federal agencies
into a prominent role in the struggle to reduce job accidents and diseases."5
But in the years that followed, clamor over the economic impact of the statute
upon small businesses16 and dismay over the government's promulgation of
allegedly trivial safety and health standards' 7 combined to divert concern away
from the Act's goal of achieving healthful working conditions. 8 Upon occasion,
an incident of disaster proportions would make headlines, 19 but ongoing
exposures to toxic substances attracted little interest. The vinyl chloride crisis
serves as a grim reminder thatjob health hazards did not vanish with the passage
of the new law. Indeed, it underscores the need for vigilant oversight of the
federal government's regulation of toxic exposures in the workplace.
After reviewing the statutory mandate for government action, this article
will consider three aspects of the government's application of the 1970 Act
to industrial health hazards: the development of recommendations for health
standards by NIOSH; the setting of health standards by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA); and OSHA's enforcement of those stan-
dards. The carcinogen standard is examined as a case study of OSHA's perfor-
mance in standard setting, while the Target Health Hazard Program is used
to illustrate its enforcement activities. By no means an exhaustive coverage of
the entire topic, the article seeks to stimulate continuing examination of the
federal government's performance in protecting workers from the dangers of
toxic substances.
I See Food and Drug Administration, Vinyl Chloride as an Ingredient of Drug and Cosmetic
Aerosol Products, id at 30,830.
9Id.
" See Consumer Product Safety Commission, Self-Pressurized Household Substances ContainingVinyl Chloride: Proposed Classification as a Banned Hazardous Substance, id. at 30,112.
"See Saar, supra note 3.
12 See Kramer, supra note 5. See also Saar, supra note 3.
13 See J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES 11-46 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BrTER WAGES].
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
15 For a background to the Act, see BITTER WAGES chs. 3-8.
" See generally Hearings on Small Business and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Before
the Subcomm. on Environmental Problems Affecting Small Business of the House Select Comm. on Small
Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearings on Implementation of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972).
1"See BITTER WAGE 201-02.
18 "The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy... to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve
our human resources." Occ. Safety & Health Act § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1970).
" See, e.g. Nunes, Indictments to Be Sought in Collapse of High-Rise, Washington Post, Apr. 17,
1973, § A, at 1, col. 3 (fourteen workers killed in Virginia).
652
THE WAGES ARE STILL BITTER
I
THE STATUTORY MANDATE
The statute gives the Secretary of Labor broad authority to promulgate and
enforcejob safety and health standards,2 0 a function delegated to OSHA21 within
the Labor Department. It also requires the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, through NIOSH, to develop criteria and recommended standards
for exposures to toxic substances and harmful physical agents,2 2 and to carry
out various research and educational programs.
23
The Act permits three methods of standard setting. Within two years from
the effective date of the Act, OSHA could publish as final federal standards,
without recourse to rulemaking procedures, any existing national consensus
standards or established federal standards.24 On May 29, 1971, OSHA took
advantage of this provision to promulgate a large number of standards, including
some 400 Threshold Limit Values (TLV's) which set limits for exposure to
toxic substances over a forty-hour week. 25 The TLV's had been developed by
the American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a
private group, and had been adopted as federal standards in 1969 under the
Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act.2 6
OSHA may also set emergency temporary standards upon a finding that
employees are exposed to grave danger and require immediate protection.2 7
An emergency temporary standard takes effect immediately upon publication
in the Federal Register, and lasts no more than six months.
The final method by which permanent standards are promulgated involves
rulemaking procedures spelled out in the Act.28 In the formulation of health
standards, NIOSH performs detailed scientific research and makes recommenda-
tions which may encompass safe exposure levels, necessary warnings, methods
20 Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 6, 9-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 655, 658-59 (1970).
21 The acronym "OSHA" has also been applied to the Act itself. See BITTER WAGES 167; Cohen,
The Occupational Safety and Health Act: A Labor Lawyer's Overview, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 788 (1972);
Note, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: State Plans and the General Duty Clause, 34
OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (1973); Note, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: Some Unresolved
Issues and Potential Problems, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 304 (1972).
22 0cc. Safety & Health Act § 20(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(3) (1970).
23 NIOSH's responsibilities include: making toxic-substance hazard evaluations on request of
employers or employees, id. § 20(a)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(6); publishing industry-wide studies
of the effect of chronic or low-level exposure to substances, processes, and stresses, id.§ 20(a)(7),
29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(7); publishing an annual list of all known toxic substances and the concentrations
at which toxicity is known to occur, id.§ 20(a)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(6); conducting educational
programs to secure an adequate supply of personnel to administer the Act, id. § 21(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 670(a); and providing for programs to train employers and employees in job accident and illness
prevention, id. § 2 1(c), 29 U.S.C. § 670(c). See also Health Resources Administration, Dep't of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority Amendments, 39
Fed. Reg. 1456 (1974).
24 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1970).
25 OSHA, National Consensus Standards and Established Federal Standards, 36 Fed. Reg. 10,466,
10,504-06 (1971).
26 Public Contracts, Dep't of Labor, Safety and Health Standards for Federal Supply Contracts,
34 Fed. Reg. 7946 (1969).
27 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 6(c), 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1970).
2 8 Id. § 6(b), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b).
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of monitoring, and a requirement of medical examinations. 29 But ultimate
responsibility for issuing the standard rests with the Secretary of Labor30 and
thus with OSHA. A person who may be adversely affected by a standard may
challenge its validity in a federal court of appeals.3 '
OSHA also bears the burden of enforcing the Act. Its inspectors may issue
citations for violations of standards3 2 or of the statutory general duty clause.33
These citations may be contested before an independent Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission,34 from which decisions may be appealed to
a federal court of appeals.3 5
II
THE PERFORMANCE OF NIOSH
A. Institutional Inadequacies
Viewed in its historical perspective and against the magnitude of its task,
NIOSH's record invites a sense of despair. Federal agencies concerned with
occupational health predate World War 1.36 NIOSH's immediate predecessor,
the Bureau of Occupational Safety and Health, was charged with being ineffective
in the years prior to the passage of the 1970 Act. Critics alleged that it was
woefully underfunded, lost in the tangles of the HEW bureaucracy, permeated
with an aloof air of professionalism which divorced it from what should have
been its working-class constituency, and hobbled by a lack of legal authority
that forced it to adopt an excessively subservient attitude toward industry in
order to gain access to the information needed to carry out research.37
The 1970 Act gave the agency a new name, responsibilities, and legal authority
to enter workplaces and obtain information from employees.38 Unfortunately,
this has not amounted to a new lease on life. Dr. Marcus M. Key, NIOSH's
Director until September 1, 1974, put it this way in 1973:
NIOSH is not expanding, it is shrinking. It is getting the proverbial meat ax.... Our
present laboratory space isn't even adequate for any kind of research. It's substan-
dard.... We have been frozen on hirings for most of our existence, and we are
losing key staff right and left because we don't have the grade points to promote
them.... I don't think NIOSH is a viable organization at this time.'3
29 Id. §§ 6(b)(1), 6(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(1), 655(b)(7).
30 Id. § 2(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3).311d. § 6(f), 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
32Id. § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 658.
33Id. § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). See also Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1973).
4 0cc. Safety & Health Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970).
5Id. § l1(a), 29 U.S.C. § 660(a).
36 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH 105 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 PRESIDENT'S REPORT].
37 See BITTER WAGES 88-94.
38 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 20(b), 29 U.S.C. § 669(b) (1970).
39Quoted in Brody, Many Workers Still Face Health Peril Despite Law, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1974,
at 20, col. 5.
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When asked to update this statement in March, 1974, Key replied, "If anything,
it's worse. 40
In the years prior to 1970, the agency suffered constant reorganization,4 1
an affliction which has not ceased. When the Act became effective, NIOSH
was shifted into the Health Services and Mental Health Administration within
HEW's Public Health Service. 42 In mid-1973, NIOSH was transferred to the
Center for Disease Control, which also falls within the Public Health Service. 43
Thus, the Institute remains an obscure nook within a gigantic department, unable
to draw attention to the pervasive problems of occupational health.4 4 Moreover,
HEW-imposed personnel restrictions threaten to damage severely the agency's
ability to retain a professional staff.45
B. Procedures for Formulating Standards
It is estimated that U.S. factories and workshops make use of or generate
some 25,000 toxic substances, and that industry introduces 500 to 600 new
toxic substances each year. 46 NIOSH must not only develop recommendations
and criteria for the most harmful of these (reckoned at 1,000 to 2,00047), it
must also update the existing 400 legal standards based upon what may now
be inadequate TLV's.4 8 Since the effective date of the 1970 Act and as of Sep-
tember 1, 1974, NIOSH has produced eighteen criteria documents with stan-
40 Id. For a detailed report of the agency calling for a budget of $50 million, see NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF EIGHTY MILLION
AMERICANS: A NATIONAL GOAL FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (1965), reprinted in Hearings on S.
2193 and S. 2788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1727, 1740 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 2193 and
S. 2788]. For budget appropriations since fiscal year 1972, in which the NIOSH budget has been
limping along at slightly more than half this amount, see EXECUTIVE OFFCE OF THE PRESIDENT,
THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 103 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as 1973 PRESIDENT'S REPORT]. For the HEW request for $25,848,000 for fiscal year 1975, seeHearings
on Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 340 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on 1975
Appropriations].
41 See BITTER WAGES 88-90.
42 See 1972 PRESIDENT'S REPORT 105.
43 See OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, 1973-74, at 231 (1973).
See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE: SLOW PROGRESS LIKELY IN DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND HARM-
FUL PHYSICAL AGENTS FOUND IN WORKPLACES 7 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].
44 The testimony of Dr. Marcus M. Key, Director of NIOSH, at appropriations hearings suggests
that of a vox clamantis in deserto. See Hearings on 1975 Appropriations, pt. 3, at 258, 311, where
Dr. Key had to compete for attention with programs for rat and venereal disease control.
45 Although NIOSH asserts that its civil service grade average should be at least 9.5, HEW
placed a freeze on hiring in August, 1971, when the NIOSH average was 7.81, and the Institute
was not allowed to hire or replace employees above the GS-9 level until February, 1972. See GAO
REPORT 41-42. Furthermore, NIOSH was directed to decrease its average to 7.7 by June 30, 1972,
and then to 7.64 by June 30, 1973. It consequently suffered personnel cuts in fiscal years 1973
and 1974. Id.
46Id. at 16.
47 Id.
48 See Testimony of Professor Samuel S. Epstein, M.D., Case Western Reserve University Medical
School, before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
Apr. 25, 1974, at 7 (on file with the authors).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
dards recommendations. 49 On the basis of these materials, OSHA has produced
only one final standard.
5 0
The statutory basis for NIOSH's involvement in the setting of health standards
derives from section 20(a)(2) of the Act, which requires the agency "to consult
with [OSHA] in order to develop specific plans for such research, demonstrations,
and experiments as are necessary to produce criteria... enabling [OSHA] to
meet [its] responsibility for the formulation of safety and health standards under
this Act."15 1 OSHA's responsibility for formulating health standards is spelled
out in some detail in section 6(b)(5):
[OSHA], in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical
agents..., shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has
regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of
his working life. Development of standards ... shall be based upon research,
demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may be appro-
priate.... Whenever practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed in
terms of objective criteria and of the performance desired. 52
When read together, these provisions clearly call for health standards based
on sound factual data, but they also invest paramount importance in protecting
workers. NIOSH, remaining faithful to its scientific bent, has emphasized careful
research.
A recent report issued by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) describes
the procedures followed by NIOSH in developing a criteria document.53 The
first step, taking an estimated six to twelve months, involves a literature search
of existing information on the toxic substance or physical agent in question.
Next, NIOSH may initiate its own research to fill in any gaps in the data. This
is an open-ended process whose breadth and length will vary according to the
amount and quality of existing research. NIOSH may contract some or all of
this research to outside investigators. The GAO report concludes that from
three to five years may be necessary for this step. The NIOSH staff then prepares
a draft of the criteria document, which is subjected to an extensive review process
involving NIOSH technicians, outside consultants, professional societies, and
other federal agencies. It takes from twelve to fourteen months for this review
to culminate in final approval by the Director of NIOSH and the General Counsel
of HEW.
In light of the demonstrated need for urgent and massive action in the
occupational health area, the process followed by NIOSH is agonizingly slow.
On the one hand, the scope of the review to which draft documents are subjected
49 The Health Services and Mental Health Administration of NIOSH has issued the following
recommended standards criteria documents on occupational exposure: Beryllium (1972), Carbon
Monoxide (1972), Hot Environments (1972), Inorganic Lead (1972), Noise (1972), Asbestos (1972),
Ultraviolet Radiation (1972), Coke Oven Emissions (1973), Chronic Acid (1973), Inorganic Mercury
(1973), Toluene (1973), Toluene Diisocyanate (1973), Trichloroethylene (1973), Inorganic Arsenic
(1974), Sulfuric Acid (1974), and Sulphur Dioxide (1974).
50 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93a (1973).
01 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 20(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(2) (1970).
52 Id. § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5).
53 GAO REPORT 24-26.
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may be questioned on the ground that the procedures followed by OSHA permit
sufficient participation by outside groups and individuals.54 On the other, the
NIOSH process has been criticized for the conflicts of interest which have
allegedly tainted the involvement of outside consultants, 55 and for the Institute's
failure to publish draft criteria documents in the Federal Register to assure
that any interested party will have the opportunity to share in the formulation
of the final document.
56
The 1972 President's Report on Occupational Safety and Health stated that "there
may be as many as 100,000 deaths per year from occupationally caused dis-
eases," 57 a startling disclosure that somehow failed to find its way into the 1973
Report.58 A basic assumption of the 1970 Act was that the promulgation of
standards relating to exposure to disease-causing substances would be central
to federal efforts to reduce the toll. Yet congressional funding and the agency's
own procedures have left NIOSH armed with a peashooter for the tiger hunt.
III
OSHA's ADOPTION OF THE CARCINOGEN STANDARD
On the effective date of the 1970 Act, it was no secret that American workers
were being exposed to carcinogenic substances.5 9 Yet OSHA did not seem to
assign high priority to the development of standards that would limit or eliminate
these exposures. Indeed, when the first package of existing federal and national
consensus standards was promulgated under section 6(a),60 the agency inexplica-
bly lost an opportunity to put into effect a total ban on nine known carcinogens,
61
forcing itself to invoke the formal standard setting procedures of the Act. The
resulting permanent carcinogen standard was the first health rule developed
54 See Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 6(b)(1)-(4), 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(1)-(4) (1970).
" See Testimony ot Frotessor Samuel S. Epstein, M.D., supra note 48, at 9-I0; Hearings on 1975
Appropriations, pt. 3, at 288-90.
56 0cc. Safety & Health Act § 6(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(3)(1970). See GAO REPORT 58-60.
57 1972 PRESIDENT's REPORT 111.
58 The omission did not pass unnoticed during the House appropriations hearings for fiscal
year 1975. See Hearings on 1975 Appropriations, pt. 1, at 454-55, 464-66.
5 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1970); S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970).
60 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1970).
6 1 See OSHA, National Consensus Standards and Established Federal Standards, 36 Fed. Reg.
10,466, 10,504-06 (1971), codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93 (1973). The regulations issued on that
day activated as enforceable standards under the 1970 Act exposure standards already in effect
under a federal statute which had adopted by reference exposure limits for some 400 substances
set in 1968 by the American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). See Public
Contracts, Dep't of Labor, Safety and Health Standards for Federal Supply Contracts, 34 Fed.
Reg. 7946 (1969). The document containing TLV's of airborne contaminant adopted by ACGIH
for 1969 is reprinted in Hearings on S. 2193 and S. 2788, at 1249-77. Additions to, and changes
from, the 1968 list are noted. An appendix to the list of substances named nine compounds to
which "[blecause of the high incidence of cancer, either in man or in animals, no exposure or
contact by any route, respiratory, oral or skin should be permitted." Id. at 1269. OSHA took the
position that the appendix was not included in the 1971 package. The compounds listed in the
appendix were included in OSHA, Emergency Temporary Standard on Certain Carcinogens, 38
Fed. Reg. 10,929 (1973).
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from scratch by OSHA 62 and provides a useful case study of the agency's
capabilities.
It was pressure from union leaders that ultimately spurred OSHA into action,
albeit at a somewhat leisurely pace. In late April, 1972, a delegation from the
AFL-CIO met with the Secretaries of Labor and HEW to urge stronger enforce-
ment of the 1970 Act.6 They complained particularly about OSHA's failure
to set standards for cancer-related toxic substances. The next month, an OSHA
official wrote to NIOSH asking for information on carcinogens mentioned by
the unionists.64 In July, NIOSH published a notice in the Federal Register
requesting information on fifteen carcinogenic substances as the first step in
the formulation of a criteria document. 65 A letter from NIOSH's Director to
OSHA on July 12, 1972, warned that "[r]ecognizing the frailties of the current
state of technology in the area... you can understand that alternative approaches
to carcinogen control in the workplace must be achieved in a different manner
than is used for control of other substances."' 6
Among the "frailties" was the difficulty in ascertaining a clear cause and
effect relationship between job exposures and cancer. It may be possible to
establish that a substance can cause cancer in animals. But short of actual
instances, how does one show that a substance-even a specific dose of an animal
carcinogen-will cause cancer in man? Because the Act does not automatically
ban substances found to produce cancer in animals, 67 OSHA had to decide
at what point animal tests provided "the best available evidence" that an exposed
employee would suffer "material impairment of health or functional capacity."6 8
Since a finding that an employee would be exposed to serious danger from
exposure could trigger the promulgation of an emergency temporary standard,
OSHA also had to decide at what point the evidence would justify that finding.
62 As of this writing, OSHA has exercised its authority under the 1970 Act to set (1) an emergency
temporary asbestos standard, OSHA, Emergency Standard for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 36 Fed.
Reg. 23,207-08 (1971), as well as a permanent asbestos standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93a (1973),
the latter of which has substantially survived judicial review, Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO
v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974); (2) an emergency temporary pesticide standard, OSHA,
Emergency Temporary Standard for Exposure to Organophosphorous Pesticides, 38 Fed. Reg.
10,715-17 (1973), effective date suspended, id. at 15,729, republished as amended, id. at 17,214-16,
which the Fifth Circuit has vacated, Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor,
489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974); (3) an emergency temporary, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93 (1973), and permanent
carcinogen standard, OSHA, Carcinogens, 39 Fed. Reg. 3756-97 (1974), with the former partially
set aside by the Third Circuit, Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d
Cir. 1973), and the latter currently under review by the Third Circuit, Synthetic Organic Chem.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, Civil No. 74-1129 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 1974); and partially under review
by the Third Circuit, Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Brennan, Civil No.
74-1149 (3d Cir., filed Feb. 1, 1974); and (4) an emergency temporary, OSHA, Emergency Temporary
Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,342-44 (1974), and proposed permanent
standard for vinyl chloride, OSHA, Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, id at 35,890.
63 See Culhane, Occupational Safety Agency Weighs Emergency Standardfor Chemical Compounds, NAT'L
J., Apr. 21, 1973, at 567.
64 See id.
65 37 Fed. Reg. 13,285-86 (1972).
"' Letter from Dr. Marcus M. Key, Director of NIOSH, to M. Chain Robbins, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Labor, OSHA, July 12, 1972.
67 The Occupational Safety and Health Act contains no provisions similar to the clause of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act which does require such a ban. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A),
360b(d)(1)(h), 376(b)(5)(B) (1970).
68 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1970).
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One approach might have been to take immediate action against those sub-
stances, such as betanaphthylamine, which had already been firmly linked to
cancer in humans, and had been placed on the AGGIH zero-exposure list.69
But OSHA preferred to ponder the problem. In Januray of 1973, the Oil,
Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW) and the Health Research Group
(HRG) filed a petition with OSHA for an emergency temporary standard (ETS)
for ten carcinogens.7 0 This followed the pattern of earlier asbestos proceedings,
which did not commence until a labor union filed a petition with OSHA, despite
considerable evidence establishing the hazards of asbestos dust.7 ' In February,
OSHA responded by invoking section 6 (g) of the Act to set a high priority
for the development of a standard.7 2 Three months later, the agency issued
its own emergency temporary standard for fourteen carcinogens.
7 3
Unlike the ETS for asbestos, which reduced the existing TLV for asbestos
dust to which employees could be exposed,7 4 the emergency carcinogen standard
was somewhat modest and vague. After a bald recitation that the fourteen sub-
stances were carcinogenic and presented a grave danger to employees, the regula-
tion imposed certain requirements on work practices in areas where the car-
cinogens were being handled.7 5 The only provision for medical surveillance
11 See Hearings on S. 2193 and S. 2788, at 1269. The inadequacy of state occupational health
laws to prevent worker exposure to betanaphthylamine had been cited as a reason for the passage
of the federal statute. H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1970). Exposure to the
chemical has continued. See Brodeur, Annals of Industry-Casualties of the Workplace, NEW YORKER,
Nov. 19, 1973, at 87, 143. Brodeur's five-part series has been published in book form under the
title Expendable Americans.
70 Petition to OSHA by Health Research Group and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Interna-
tional Union Requesting a Zero Tolerance for Ten Carcinogens Through an Emergency Temporary
Standard Issued Under the Authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, received by
OSHA on Jan. 4, 1973 (on file with the authors). The carcinogen petition asked for a standard
that allowed "no exposure or contact by any route" for the ten substances and mixtures containing
them, except as sanctioned by a use permit system. The permit system was based on systems in
effect in Pennsylvania, 25 PA. R. & REGS. § 205.1 (1971), and England, STAT. INSTR. 1967, No.
879 (Carcinogenic Substances Regulation). The proposed zero-tolerance regulation requiringjustifi-
cation for use was derived from 12A N.Y. CODES, R. & REGS. §§ 12-1.6(a)(1), 12-1.6(c), 12-18.5
(1971). OSHA could grant permits upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that no substitute
for the chemical existed or that the formation of the chemical as an intermediate in a reaction
was unavoidable, and where the applicant had installed monitoring equipment and acute exposure
treatment facilities and had established medical surveillance programs. The petition also asked
for regulations requiring continuous monitoring, with medical and monitoring records kept for
each worker and signs posted in the immediate vicinity of the substance. OSHA would be required
to review permits every six months.
71 For an excellent, detailed account of the asbestos proceedings, see Brodeur, Annals of Indus-
ty-Casualties of the Workplace, NEW YORKER, Oct. 29, 1973, at 44; id., Nov. 5, 1973, at 92; id.,
Nov. 12, 1973, at 131; id., Nov. 19, 1973, at 87; id., Nov. 26, 1973, at 126.
72 38 Fed. Reg. 4037-40 (1973).
73 Id. at 10,929-30. The carcinogens were among those in the July 6th NIOSH request for
information. See note 65 supra. The one chemical on the NIOSH list not included in the ETS
was dimethyl sulfate.
7 36 Fed. Reg. 23,207-08 (1971).
7' Employers were required to provide showers and "clean" and "dirty" changing rooms;
employees were to shower each time they left the work area and were to be given clean clothing
each time they entered. 38 Fed. Reg. 10,929 (1973). Signs were to warn that the chemical was
"Cancer-Producing." Id. at 10,930. The standard exempted mixtures containing less than one per
cent (by weight) of the carcinogen and workplaces where the carcinogen was transshipped in sealed
containers. Id. at 10,929.
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and monitoring was that the employer send OSHA information about the type
of medical surveillance and monitoring that had been instituted.7 6 Though the
purpose of the ETS was to protect workers from exposure to carcinogens, the
thrust of the monitoring and medical surveillance sections was merely infor-
mational.77 Shortly after OSHA issued the emergency standard, the OCAW
and HRG filed suit challenging it,7s and the Dry Color Manufacturers' Association
petitioned for a stay.79
Under section 6(c)(3) of the Act, an ETS upon publication serves also as
a proposed rule for a permanent standard.80 On July 16, OSHA republished
the carcinogen ETS as a proposed rule and added two new parts to the proposal.81
The first, in the form of general statements rather than proposed regulations,
put interested parties on notice that OSHA was considering the promulgation
of further requirements relating to medical examinations, monitoring, and
reporting. The second was a new proposed rule establishing a system of use
permits. The proposal was much less stringent than one included in the petition
for an emergency standard by the OCAW and HRG.8 2 The publication of this
proposal seemed to be aimed at forestalling objections that inadequate consider-
ation was being given to the idea of a use permit system. Shortly afterward,
OSHA revised the ETS itself by modifying a number of the work practice require-
ments in response to comments, objections, and recommendations.8 3 Many com-
panies apparently had difficulty understanding the ETS, and though variances
76 Id. at 10,930.
77 The Advisory Committee on Carcinogens was told that the purpose of the monitoring and
medical surveillance sections was "to ascertain what medical surveillance programs are in effect
and what monitoring is being done." Steven Witt, Office of the Solicitor, OSHA, Transcript of
the Standards Advisory Committee on Carcinogens, Aug. 2, 1973, at 91 [hereinafter cited as SACC].
78 Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Brennan, Civil No. 73-1383 (3d Cir., filed May
9, 1973).
79 In Dry Colors Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973), the court
set aside the ETS for two of the carcinogens, on the ground that OSHA's statement of reasons
for finding that the chemicals were carcinogenic and that the requirements of the ETS were necessary
to protect employees were inadequate (a charitable conclusion, inasmuch as it was nonexistent),
and hence a violation of section 6(e) of the Act, which provides that "[wlhenever the Secretary
promulgates any standard... under this Act, he shall include a statement of the reasons for such
action, which shall be published in the Federal Register." Occ. Safety & Health Act § 6(e), 29
U.S.C. § 655(e) (1970). The court stated that the regulation should have at least referred to the
documentary evidence upon which the finding of carcinogenicity was based, and explained why
the procedures set out in the standard were chosen. Although not ruling upon the substantive
issue of whether the record supported a finding that the two chemicals in question were carcinogenic,
the court expressed its considerable doubts. 486 F.2d at 105-07. See also Associated Indus. v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1974). In setting aside a standard requiring
lavatories in workplaces, the court rejected the Labor Department's contention that a less severe
standard of review apply to legislative-type determinations, and held that not only findings of
fact but also policy decisions relating to the regulation must be supported by substantial evidence
in the record. Id. at 348-50. See generally Note, Judicial Review Under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act: The Substantial Evidence Test as Applied to Informal Rulemaking, 1974 DUKE L.J. 459.
80 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 6(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(3) (1970).
8' OSHA, Emergency Temporary Standard for Certain Carcinogens: Commencement of
Rulemaking Proceeding, 38 Fed. Reg. 18,900-03 (1973). It omitted requirements for justification
that no substitute for the carcinogenic chemical existed, preapproval inspections by OSHA, and
permit reapproval by OSHA every six months. See Petition to OSHA, supra note 70.82 See note 70 supra.
83 OSHA, Revision of Emergency Temporary Standard on Certain Carcinogens, 38 Fed. Reg.
20,074-76 (1973).
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were requested and granted, some plants made no attempt to comply. 8 4 At
the same time, OSHA was enforcing the emergency standard without resort
to monitoring equipment, relying instead on mere physical observation by inspec-
tors.
8 5
Meanwhile, OSHA had exercised its discretionary authority under section
6(b)(1) to establish a Standards Advisory Committee on Carcinogens. 86 Numer-
ous administrative problems hampered the Committee from the beginning.
Though scheduled to hold only eight to ten sessions,87 it held twenty, and still
did not have time to consider carefully the form of the use permit system, 88
requirements for record-keeping,8 9 and regulations which should govern mix-
tures containing carcinogens. 90 None of the members received any data prior
to the first meeting.91 NIOSH, overburdened with information received as a
result of its July, 1972, request, had not evaluated the material.9 2 The Committee
was told to attempt to obtain information on alternative technology from industry
sources, 93 but some of those sources refused to cooperate because of the propri-
etary nature of the information. 94 When Committee members wanted to sub-
poena information on which corporate witnesses had based testimony, OSHA
84 Robert E. Gleason, Polyurethane Manufacturers Association, SACC, Aug. 2, 1973, at 194.
The confusion regarding the ETS is typified by the testimony of Monsanto representatives before
the Advisory Committee. After production had been halted by the May 3rd standard, Monsanto
began again "only after we sat down with the Department of Labor and got a more realistic interpreta-
tion of what their intention was when they wrote the standard." The company showed OSHA
a letter they had written to users, indicating Monsanto's interpretation of the requirement and
asked OSHA to indicate in a letter whether or not OSHA approved of it. The letter was expected
within a couple of days but was not received, "[s]o, we have just gone with the verbal understanding
that we had, and kind of given up hope on getting written word from them [OSHA]. To make
it more complete and totally honest, they suggested, 'Why don't you get a variance? After all,
you have certain operations which may make it very difficult to meet some interpretations of this
standard, and therefore, why don't you just come in for a variance?'" However, Monsanto's legal
department preferred not to request a variance as the public might think that "[tihe company
was trying to get around the standard." Donald M. Ross, Monsanto, id. at 151, 170.
11 See OSHA Program Directive No. 200-19 (1973) (original ETS); OSHA Program Directive
No. 200-19A (1973) (revised ETS).
86 See Charter, Standards Advisory Committee on Carcinogens (on file with the authors). Its
first meeting took place on July 25, 1973.
87 Id.
" An OSHA official instructed the Advisory Committee to recommend or reject the idea of
a use permit system and to leave administrative details to OSHA. SACC, Aug. 24, 1973, at 874.
Differences of opinion on the Advisory Committee were sufficient to cause the defeat of a motion
to adopt as a recommendation OSHA's proposed permit system. See id. at 1066.
89 The Advisory Committee voted on the record-keeping requirements contained in the July
27th revision, though without discussion, due to a lack of time. Several Committee members had
wanted to strengthen the OSHA requirements. See id. at 1071.
90 The question of mixtures containing carcinogens had been tabled to allow discussion of other
requirements. Id. at 1065. By the time discussion of the subject resumed, there was no longer
a quorum. Id. at 1077. The Advisory Committee also discussed the desirability of regulating chemicals
which could combine to form a carcinogen, such as happens when formaldehyde and hydrochloric
acid combine to produce bis chloromethyl ether. See, e.g., id., June 27, 1973, at 27; id., July 19,
1973, at 125.
"' See id., June 25, 1973, at 203. Initially there had been no provision for distributing NIOSH
material to Committee members.
'2 See id., June 26, 1973, at 9.
93 See id., July 12, 1973, at 230.
84 See id., Aug. 15, 1973, at 62.
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denied the request. 95 The Committee was also instructed not to inquire into the
relative carcinogenicity of the substances96 or into economic considerations.97
The Committee's final recommendation called for a performance standard
of "no measurable exposure or contact... by any route, oral, respiratory or
skin."98 It endorsed in principle the idea of a use permit system " and specified
work practice rules that were in many respects stricter than those proposed
by OSHA. °00 In mid-September, OSHA held hearings on the various proposed
standards. As one might have expected, labor representatives supported the
recommendations of the Advisory Committee, 1 ' while industry officials argued
that proof of human carcinogenicity was inadequate,'10 2 that threshold limit values
See 3 0cc. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 350 (1973).
9 6 See SACC, June 25, 1973, at 76.97 See id., Aug. 15, 1973, at 114. Economic considerations did, however, intrude when the Commit-
tee reached a consensus on monitoring by the "most sensitive, feasible sampling and analytical
methods available," id., Aug. 16, 1973, at 163, defining "feasible" as "capable of being accomplished
successfully within the best practicable available technology as it exists or may develop." Id. at
206. In reaching this conclusion, the Committee discussed loss of jobs, the economic importance
of some of the carcinogens, and potential monopolization by those firms which could afford the
costs. See, e.g., id., June 23, 1973, at 27, 100; id., June 27, 1973, at 131; id., Aug. 8, 1973, at
40; id., Aug. 15, 1973, at 100; id., Aug. 17, 1973, at 33. The Committee also discussed the amount
of epidemiological evidence that would justify the imposition of heavy costs. See, e.g., id., July
12, 1973, at 148; id., July 13, 1973, at 4; id., July 19, 1973, at 208.
98 OSHA, Standards Advisory Committee on Carcinogens: Notice of Receipt of Recommendations
of the Committee and of Their Availability for Public Inspection, 38 Fed. Reg. 24,373-77 (1973).
99Id. at 24,378.
"0 The Committee recommended that employers should use monitoring and sampling proce-
dures "appropriate to each carcinogen or combination of carcinogens and capable of detecting
by the most sensitive, feasible methods available." Id. The Committee expressed concern that
extremely sensitive monitoring provide almost continuous feedback; it urged OSHA, in conjunction
with NIOSH and the Environmental Protection Agency, to develop monitors with a sensitivity
of at least one part carcinogen per one billion parts of air, with readings at a maximum two-hour
interval and a back-up system to provide readings at ten-minute intervals with a sensitivity of at
least 100 parts per billion. Id.
The Committee's recommendation made no distinction between outdoor and indoor regulated
areas. Id. at 24,376. The question whether outdoor areas could or should be regulated came under
consideration by the Committee, which felt that if a distinction were made, it might be used as
a loophole. See SACC, Aug. 23, 1973, at 423, 453.
The Committee rejected, by a 7-2 vote (with three abstentions), the "Cancer-Suspect" sign on
carcinogen containers required by the revised ETS, on the ground that it did not sufficiently apprise
employees of the danger. Id. at 647, 667. The Committee's recommendation was that the sign
on the containers read "Cancer-Hazard, Danger-Avoid All Contact and Exposure." 38 Fed. Reg.
at 24,377.
The Committee recommended that employees who worked in regulated areas be given a training
and indoctrination program specifying the process, the nature of the hazard, the medical surveillance
programs, and the employee's role in emergency procedures. Id.
101 Labor representatives argued that a zero tolerance level should be set, and that medical-
reporting requirements should include the exposure of each employee. See 1 OSHA, Hearings on
Proposed Regulation of Certain Carcinogens 105 (1973); 4 id. at 768, 774 [hereinafter cited as Carcinogen
Hearings].1
'
2 See generally 1 id. at 95; 2 id. at 199, 280; 3 id. at 394, 440, 540, 601; 4 id. at 710.
Industry argued either that animal studies were per se insufficient evidence of potential human
carcinogenesis or that they might support the carcinogenic potential of inordinately large doses
of the substance in question applied in ways (such as through subcutaneous injection) that did
not relate to human exposure at the worksite. There were indications that industry was unwilling
to admit to any carcinogenesis. For example, counsel for Dow Chemical interrupted cross-examination
of one of Dow's witnesses, Dr. Perry Gehrig, and contradicted Dr. Gehrig's testimony that Dow
considered bis chloromethyl ether, one of the substances to be regulated, carcinogenic. Dr. Gehrig
nonetheless reiterated his prior statement. 3 id. at 615.
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should be set,' °3 that the Act did not authorize a use permit system, 0 4 and
that strict controls were not economically feasible.'0 5 Though these were not
adversary proceedings in the adjudicative sense, some cross-examination was
permitted. 0 6 An administrative law judge presided and certified the record,
without making any findings.
Economic considerations obviously troubled OSHA. The final decision on
the permanent standard for asbestos had taken into account the financial costs
of compliance 0 7 and had been challenged on this point.'0 8 To ascertain the
costs of the carcinogen standard, OSHA prepared an economic impact state-
ment.'0 9 Though not required by the Act, this was a much wiser course than
that followed in developing the asbestos standard, when OSHA contracted with
a private consulting firm to provide an economic impact study." 0 OSHA's cost
study for the carcinogen standard concluded that the economic effect might
be significant for only six of the fourteen substances."' While the study attempted
to estimate the number of workers exposed to the carcinogens, it affixed no
economic cost to the harm they might suffer because of a determination that
this type of measurement was impossible." 2 In early December, the Assistant
103 See, e.g., l id. at 25, 70, 93; 2 id. at 181; 3 id. at 397, 585.
104 See I id. at 25, 70; 2 id. at 162, 296, 368; 3 id. at 397; 4 id. at 675. The basic contentions
were that the Act required that standards be applied uniformly, with provision for variances, and
that the proposed permit system would allow the immediate closing of a plant, in contravention
of the requirement of a court order, as specified in section 13 of the Act dealing with imminent
hazards. See Occ. Safety & Health Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 662 (1970). Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company argued that a permit system would decrease worker vigilance, and would discourage
plant improvements by requiring a new permit for every alteration. See4 Carcinogen Hearings 635.
105 See, e.g., 2 Carcinogen Hearings 317; 3 id. at 406, 434, 556; 4 id. at 691.
106 See OSHA, Emergency Temporary Standard for Certain Carcinogens: Commencement of
Rulemaking Proceeding, 38 Fed. Reg. 18,900 (1973). The procedure was similar to that used in
the asbestos hearing, described in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467
(D. C. Cir. 1974).107See OSHA, Standard for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318, 11,319 (1972).
108 A judicial decision rendered after the promulgation of the permanent carcinogen standard
vindicated OSHA's use of economic considerations. In upholding the asbestos standard, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that "practical considerations can temper protective require-
ments. Congress does not appear to have intended to protect employees by putting their employers
out of business-either by requiring protective devices unavailable under existing technology or
by making financial viability generally impossible." Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,
499 F.2d at 477-78. The decision to permit economic factors to be weighed rested upon the court's
interpretation of a single statutory term. Section 6(b)(5) of the Act requires OSHA, when promulgat-
ing standards relating to toxic substances or harmful physical agents, to "set the standard which
most adequately assures, to the extent feasible ... that no employee will suffer material impairment
of health or functional capacity" and to take into account "the feasibility of the standards." Occ.
Safety & Health Act § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1970). There is nothing in the legislative history
to demonstrate that Congress intended "feasibility" to include economic considerations. But see
Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 130 (5th Cir. 1974).
In overruling the pesticide's ETS, the court stated: "The promulgation of any standard will depend
upon a balance between the protection afforded by the requirement and the effect upon economic
and market conditions in the industry."
109 OSHA, Some Economic Aspects of an Occupational Safety and Health Standard for the
Use of Fourteen Carcinogenic Compounds (1973) (preliminary study based on data available as
of Aug. 10, 1973).
110 For a description of the study and its conflict-of-interests aspects, see Brodeur, Annals of
Industry--Casualties of the Workplace, NEw YORKER, Nov. 19, 1973, at 87.
11 OSHA, supra note 109, at 54.
112 Interview with David Bell, OSHA, in Washington, D. C., Apr. 26, 1974.
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Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health stated that the agency
must take economic impact into account in formulating the permanent standard,
but that it must not be the primary consideration; the intent of the law was
to give some, but not controlling, regard to economic costs."' 3
After some delay, at least in part because of OSHA's alleged failure to file
an adequate environmental impact statement with the Council on Environmental
Quality,1 14 the final regulation was published on January 29, 1974.115 It was
composed of fourteen separate and nearly identical standards, one for each
carcinogen. As in the case of the asbestos standard,' 1 6 OSHA did not follow
some of the key provisions of the Advisory Committee recommendation. The
standard made no mention of monitoring, although the preamble stated that
"OSHA has requested NIOSH to develop, on a priority basis, methods for deter-
mining qualitative and quantitative amounts of the carcinogens in the work-
place."" 7 No mention was made of a performance standard of no exposure,
although the preamble noted that "the intent of the standard is to reduce
exposure of workers to any of the listed substances to the maximum extent
practicable consistent with continued use."' "1 8 The idea of the use permit system
was rejected after a consideration of "the administrative and legal aspects of
a permit system, as against those of general standards enforced by the use
of the current enforcement tools of the Act."' 1 9 Some of the work practice
requirements in the permanent standards were less stringent that those recom-
mended by the Advisory Committee.' 20
OSHA gave no reason for the omission of monitoring requirements, although
there was evidence in the record that the monitoring of some, if not all, of
the substances was possible.' 2' Nor did the introduction to the standard make
113 Quoted in 3 0cc. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 861 (1974).
114 See OSHA, Occupational Safety and Health Standards: Carcinogens, 39 Fed. Reg. 3756 (1974).
115 Id. at 3756-97.
'16 See OSHA, Occupational Safety and Health Standards: Standard for Exposure to Asbestos
Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1972).
117 39 Fed. Reg. 3759 (1974).
118 Id. at 3758.
119 Id.
120 For example, the permanent standard exempted outdoor systems from ventilation require-
ments, required that employees be provided with clean clothes only for decontamination, transfer,
charging, and discharging operations, and retained the "Cancer-Suspect" sign requirement of the
July 27th revised ETS. For the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, see 38 Fed. Reg.
24,375 (1973). See also note 99 supra.
"' See OSHA, Supplement to Final Environmental Impact Statement, Proposed Regulation,
Handling of Certain Carcinogens 63 (undated, on file with the authors). The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals had recognized the importance of monitoring a challenge to the asbestos standard
"because the results of that process often determine when and what protective measures are required."
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 481. The court also stated that when
OSHA makes policy judgments, considerations of persuasive force behind those judgments must
be identified.
What we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary, when
his proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow one course
rather than another. Where that choice purports to be based on the existence of certain
determinable facts, the Secretary must, in form as well as substance, find those facts from
evidence in the record. By the same token, when the Secretary is obliged to make policy
judgments where no factual certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide the answer,
he should state and go on to identify the considerations he found persuasive.
Id. at 475-76.
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clear whether OSHA was rejecting the use permit system on legal grounds
or for reasons of administrative feasibility. At least one court has indicated
that OSHA should take into account the additional risks to which workers would
be exposed as a result of a choice based on feasibility, and balance cost to
employers (and presumably costs of administration) against risk to employees. 22
The preamble to the carcinogen regulation does not indicate that OSHA used
this type of balancing approach in opting against the use permit system. Omissions
and defects such as these have led both industry and labor to challenge the
carcinogen standard in the courts on the grounds that OSHA's performance
in setting the standard did not comport with the statutory mandate. 123
IV
OSHA ENFORCEMENT OF STANDARDS: THE TARGET
HEALTH HAZARD PROGRAM1
2 4
As part of its compliance effort, OSHA initiated a Target Health Hazard
Program, intended to focus on five specific health hazards. 2 5 Asbestos, lead,
silica, cotton dust, and carbon monoxide were selected on the basis of employee
exposure, the existence of standards, and the availability of technology to measure
levels of exposure.' 26 OSHA's inspection priorities 2 7 list the Target Health
Hazard Program as third, behind fatalities (or catastrophes) and employee com-
plaints,12 but ahead of routine and follow-up inspections.
Prior to May, 1973, OSHA did not collect and organize data to show the
number of inspections per toxic substance under the Target Health Program.
Data for the ten months between May, 1973, and February, 1974, show: (1)
122 Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 479.
123 Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Brennan, Civil No. 74-1149 (3d Cir., filed
Feb. 1, 1974); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, Civil No. 74-1129 (3d Cir., filed
Jan. 29, 1974).
124 OSHA's performance in attempting to secure compliance with job health standards in general
is difficult to evaluate because of a dearth of data. One episode, which came to light because
of the closing of a plant in Tyler, Texas, does give cause for concern. The incident is described
at length in Brodeur, Annals of Industiy--Casualties of the Workplace, NEw YORKER, Oct. 29, 1973,
at 44; id., Nov. 5, 1973, at 92; id., Nov. 12, 1973, at 131. NIOSH had taken air samples in the
plant and had found asbestos dust in violation of the current standard. Though this information
was reported to OSHA, no enforcement action was taken. Only when NIOSH officials made the
facts known to a union and the latter made an official complaint did OSHA inspectors finally
visit the plant and issue citations. The extent to which NIOSH reports violations to OSHA and
to which OSHA follows up with inspections is a matter which deserves thorough investigation.
"I See OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE TARGET HEALTH HAZARDS (OSHA Pub.
No. 2051, 1972).
126 See 1972 PRESIDENT'S REPORT 50-51. There also exists a Target Industry Program, which
is aimed at eliminating safety hazards in five industries with high accident rates. Id. at 47-50.12 7 See OSHA, U.S. DEPT'T OF LABOR, COMPLIANCE OPERATIONS MANUAL IV-2 (1972). Although
Target Health Hazard is third in priority, 35 per cent of man-hour resources is allocated to the
Target programs, while 10 per cent is allocated to catastrophe and/or fatality investigation, and
30 per cent is allocated to complaint investigation. Id. at IV-1.
128 Employees or representatives of employees may request inspections by OSHA compliance
officers if they believe that a standard violation exists in the workplace and that it threatens physical
harm. Occ. Safety & Health Act § 8(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1970).
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160 inspections for asbestos, covering fewer than 3,600 of the 200,000 employees
estimated to be exposed; (2) 275 lead inspections, covering 3,000 of the 1.6
million exposed workers; (3) 400 silica inspections, covering fewer than 4,100
of the 1.1 million workers exposed; (4) 45 cotton dust inspections, covering
944 of the estimated 800,000 workers exposed; and (5) 897 carbon monoxide
inspections, covering about 27,000 workers. 129 The conclusion we draw from
this data is that the much touted Target Health Program has, in fact, produced
only minimal compliance efforts by OSHA. This conclusion is reinforced by
comparing Target Health data with overall inspection data for January, 1974.
During that month, the Target Health Hazard Program accounted for only
147 out of 5,882 total safety and health inspections. 130 The imbalance may
be even greater, for some Target Health inspections may have resulted not
from the Program but from employee complaints. 13'
To be sure, compliance with health standards presents special problems.
For example, a shortage of industrial hygienists,' 3 2 who perform OSHA health
inspections, has clearly impeded the Program. In addition, OSHA area directors,
who want to look good on paper by recording a high number of total inspections,
may be slighting the Target Health hazards since health inspections are often
more time consuming than safety inspections. 133 Nonetheless, the conclusion
seems inescapable that the Target Health Hazard Program has been more slogan
than substance, a talking point in annual reports"34 and congressional tes-
timony,135 but in reality an enforcement effort without direction or commitment.
CONCLUSION
It is painfully clear that OSHA does not see itself as the cutting edge of
efforts to improve occupational health. As one critic has observed, the agency
"perceives itself as an arbitrator between employers and employees, with the
end result the negotiation of the workers' statutory right to 'a safe and healthful
workplace.' ,s36 A former Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety
and Health reflected this syndrome when he told a congressional committee
that "since the criticism of the OSHA program is about equal from all sides,
12 These figures were excerpted from OSHA Report 27N, National Detailed Target Health
Inspection Data (made available for hand-copying only). The statistics on exposed workers appear
in OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE TARGET HEALTH HAZARDS (OSHA Pub. No. 2051, 1972).
13' See U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA Issues January Figures on Job Safety and Health Inspections,
Press Release No. 74-117 (Mar. 14, 1974).
"3'See 1973 PRESIDENT'S REPORT 36, Table 7 n.4.
13 At the end of 1972, OSHA's field enforcement staff included only sixty-eight industrial
hygienists. Id. at 33. In May, 1973, three OSHA area offices were operating without an industrial
hygienist. See Hearings on Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations for
1974 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, at 883
(1973).
133 For example, the asbestos standard is based upon an eight-hour, time-weighted average
of airborne concentrations of asbestos fibers. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93a(b) (1973).
134 See, e.g., 1973 PRESIDENT'S REPORT 34-35.
131 See, e.g., Hearings on 1975 Appropriations, pt. 1, at 505.
3' Testimony of Bertram R. Cottine, Health Research Group, before the Select Subcomm. on
Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, May 22, 1974, at 2-3 (on file with the authors).
666
THE WAGES ARE STILL BITTER
we are probably steering the right course toward accomplishing the objectives
of the act."'137 In other words, since labor and management are equally displeased
with us, we must be doing something right; it appears not to have occurred
to OSHA that such criticism might suggest that the agency is doing nothing
right.
OSHA's failure to take the initiative in the field of job health is manifested
by the need for outside stimuli, such as petitions for standards, to prod the
agency into action. 138 The tortoise-like pace of standard development has actually
been decelerated by a new step OSHA has introduced into the procedure: an
advance notice of proposed rulemaking, so interested persons may comment
on NIOSH criteria documents submitted to OSHA.' 39 This step, which the
Act does not require, invites public participation before OSHA decides to propose
a standard. Since the public may again participate when OSHA publishes its
proposed rule, the procedure would appear to be duplicative.
It would be overly sanguine to expect that the revelations concerning vinyl
chloride will dispel the administrative neglect of occupational health. Rather,
Congress should undertake a thorough examination of every aspect of federal
regulation of occupational health, with OSHA the focus. The goal should be
to formulate a grand strategy for standards development and enforcement.
The former should encompass a regularized approach to new regulations,
the mandatory upgrading of existing exposure limits, and a capacity to deal
with emergencies. The latter requires greater resources and coordination. The
relationship between OSHA and NIOSH also deserves close attention, espe-
cially in light of OSHA's current tendency to ignore the recommendations of
NIOSH.140
A strategy without means of implementation is worthless. Congress should
commit itself to provide adequate funding for OSHA and NIOSH, an indispens-
able concomitant to any fresh assault on occupational health hazards. In addition,
the 1970 Act may need to be strengthened. For example, given the vast number
of toxic substances already in use and unregulated, it makes little sense to permit
industry to introduce new ones without legal requirements that their occupational
137Testimony of George C. Guenther, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety
and Health, in Hearings on Small Business and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, supra
note 16, at 305.
138 A recent disclosure that as many as 1.5 million workers may be exposed to a risk of lung
and lymphatic cancer from ingestion or inhalation of inorganic arsenic has set off another frantic
OSHA scramble. See Burnham, High Levels of Cancer Are Found in Arsenic Workers, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 30, 1974, at 13, col. 1; Richards, 1.5 Million Workers Exposed to Cancer Peril, Washington Post,
Aug. 30, 1974, § A, at 1, col. 1.
139 See, e.g., OSHA, Standard for Occupational Exposure to Carbon Monoxide: Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 38 Fed. Reg. 22,631-32 (1973). See also Testimony of Bertram R. Cottind,
supra note 136, at 6-7.
140 Compare NIOSH, Occupational Exposure to Asbestos (1972) (criteria document), with 21 C.F.R.
§ 1910.93a (1973) (permanent asbestos standard). For OSHA's rejection of the NIOSH criteria
document on hot environments, see Letter from John Stender, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, to Dr. Marcus M. Key, Director of NIOSH, Apr. 5, 1974.
However, it should be noted that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded in the
asbestos case that"[tlhe NIOSH recommendation was undoubtedly important in the eyes of Congress
as an aid to the Secretary, but we cannot see that it was intended as more than that." Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 477. The court pointed out that NIOSH need
not take into account "elements of feasibility," factors which OSHA must weigh in its determinations.
667
668 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
safety be established. Once they are in use, the elements of feasibility and
economic costs enter into deliberations over standards. A decision made before
the use of a new substance becomes widespread and "essential" would give
health considerations greater weight relative to industry costs than they are now
afforded. Without such broad-based, sustained, and substantial efforts to deal
with occupational health, federal action will continue to betray the lofty goals of
the 1970 Act, offering little more than rhetoric to the American worker.
